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Abstract 
Since labor protests in China are not directed at the post -socialist party-state but 
only directed at individual enterprise on a case-by-case basis, the Chinese party-state has 
articulated a response what can be called “legal absorption of labor conflict” by setting up 
new labor legislations more congruence with the interests of labor. The aim is to improve 
the wage and other compensation for individual workers without at the same time 
leading to the rise of working class at a collective level to form a class-wise organization 
or to engage in a collective social movement. However, previous labor laws set up before 
2008 have failed to stop the abuses of business on the Chinese workers. In this respect, 
many researchers have labeled the 2008 Labor Contract Law as the most significant 
piece of Chinese labor legislation passed in recent years. The aim of this paper is to 
examine the distinctive features, the histor ical process of the making, and the impact of 
the Labor Contract Law at the turn of the 21st century. In the conclusion, this paper will 
discuss the implications of the Labor Contract Law for meeting the challenge of labor 
unrest in China. 
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Since the turn of the century, China has turned into the workshop 
of the world. China‟s exports grew from US$18.1 billion in 1978 to US$266 
billion in 2001, reflecting an annual average growth rate of 12% (Nolan, 
2004, p. 910).   In a short span of 30 years, China has been quickly 
transformed from a poor, backward third world country to an economic 
powerhouse of the world. 
 
Although China is having a developmental miracle, China‟s working 
people‟s life has not gained much improvement. Instead, the literature 
likes to use label „sweat shop‟ label to characterize the despotic nature of 
the labor regime in the China‟s booming export sector.  For example, Tim 
Pringle (2001) reported that “abuses of Chinese workers‟ rights have been 
widely documented both inside and outside China over the past five years. 
Forced overtime, illegal working hours, unpaid wages, and dreadful health 
and safety conditions are commonplace. The general pace of work has 
increased dramatically as competition forces the prioritizing of order 
deadlines and production targets over safe and dignified working 
environments. „There is no such thing as an eight-hour day in China 
anymore,‟ explained a private employment agency in Shulan, northeast 
China.” 
  
Furthermore, Anita Chan (1998) points to the troubling fact that 
many of the tens of millions of workers who work in the so-called township 
and village enterprises as well as in the foreign-funded enterprises are 
victims of blatant labor rights violations, including: 
 
 Migrant workers’ lack of rights. Chinese peasants working in 
urban areas are subjected to tight “immigration” controls under 
China‟s household registration systems. They are not entitled to 
any of the benefits enjoyed by local residents such as social 
welfare, schooling, and employment for their children. 
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Periodically the police carry out raids to round up those peasants 
do not possess a temporary resident permit to stay in the city. 
Those workers are harassed, humiliated, thrown into detention 
centers, and then deported from the cities. 
 
 Forced and Bonded Labor. Under China‟s “neo-apartheid” system, 
workers are required to pay for a temporary work permit in one 
lump sum. In a seller‟s labor market, factories dictate the terms of 
employment and also charge a “deposit” of about half a month to a 
month‟s wages, further bonding the workers. Workers have to 
forfeit the “deposit” if they quit without management permission 
before the contract expires, or if they are fired. In some cases, the 
factory simply keeps a portion of the workers‟ wages each month, 
promising to return the money at the end of the year. 
 
 Subsistence or Below Subsistence Wages. In recent years the 
Chinese government has introduced a common standard for its 
urban workers, and has made these minimum wages mandatory 
in the Labor Law. In 1997, for forty-four hour work week, the 
minimum standard per month for Shenzhen Special Economic 
Zone was set at Y420 (US$54). However, despite the already low 
minimum wage, managers engage in a wide repertoire of 
manipulations to get away with paying less than the minimum 
wage. A monthly pay that looks on paper to be above the 
minimum wage is usually earned by a large amount of enforced 
overtime. It is not uncommon for workers to work two or three 
hours of overtime each day with only one or two days off every 
month. The wage system is constructed on a rigid system of 
penalties, deductions and fines. Factories devise their own sets of 
arbitrary rules and regulations in open breach of China‟s labor 
laws. Workers caught in violations of such rules will be fined. 
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 Intimidation, Physical Violence, Corporal Punishment and 
Control of Bodily Functions. The use of private security guards in 
factory and dormitory compounds is very common in China. In 
fact, factories sometimes hire policemen in their off hours to serve 
as their security guards. This type of internal security system set 
up behind factory walls is extremely effective in intimidating and 
controlling workers. Under this atmosphere of intimidation, some 
factories impose strict rules that control workers‟ bodily function 
by drastically restricting the frequency and length of time allowed 
for going to the toilet. Physical mistreatment and control of bodily 
functions are more prevalent at Korean and Taiwanese-invested 
forms. 
 
 Lack of Occupational Health and Safety. The factories are also 
known to have the lack of work insurance, the high level of 
accidents at the shop floor, the numerous factory fires, explosions, 
severed and maimed limbs, and the use of poisons with 
safeguards, with little or no medical treatments or compensations. 
In footwear factory, there is the widespread use of toxic glues in 
poorly ventilated workplaces, where workers are provided with 
neither gloves nor masks. 
 
In addition, Ching Kwan Lee (2007) and Karindi (2008) reported the 
following labor problems are common in China: unpaid wages, illegal wage 
deductions, withholding or embezzlement of employee‟s wages and social 
insurance payments by employees, payment of wages that are lower than 
the legally fixed minimum, failure to provide compensation for overtime 
work, lack of work safety and denial of any responsibility in case of an 
occupational accident. 
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 How do the Chinese working class and the state respond to this 
challenge of labor rights violations rights in the post-socialist era since the 
late 1970s? 
 
 Labor Response: Rightful Resistance.  Chinese working people have 
responded to the labor rights violations by a new wave of labor protests. 
China Labour Bulletin (2002, p.1) reports that “almost every week in Hong 
Kong and mainland China, newspapers bring reports of some kind of labor 
action: a demonstration demanding pensions; a railway line being blocked 
by angry, unpaid workers; or collective legal action against illegal 
employer behavior such as body searches or forced overtime.”  
 
Although comprehensive figures on the number of strikes and 
worker protests are not made public, official figures on so-called collective 
action (usually strikes or go-slows with a minimum of three people taking 
part) can give an indication of the extent of labor unrest. According to 
Chinese Labour Bulletin (2002, p.2), in 1998 there were 6,767 collective 
actions involving 251,268 people in 1998, and the figure jumped to 8,247 
collective actions involving 259,445 workers in 2000.  China‟s Ministry of 
Public Security also reported that the number of public protests had risen 
dramatically – from 15,000 in 1990 to 74,000 in 2007 (Wang et al. 2009, 
p.488).  Figures on the number of officially-arbitrated labor disputes also 
tell a similar story: there are 135,000 labor dispute cases in 2000, and the 
number jumped to 314,000 labor dispute cases in 2005 (Labor Statistics 
Yearbook 2006). 
 
Most of the working class‟ collective actions can be classified as 
“Rightful Resistance” (O‟Brien 1996) because workers frame their claims 
with reference to protections implied in ideologies or policies of the 
Chinese party-state, like demanding the factories to pay their wages on 
time and pay their back wages, to pay the minimum wage according to the 
state, to reimburse medical payments for on-the-job injury, or to 
Journal of Studies in Social Sciences                                         136 
compensate their forced and excessive overtime work.  Rightful resistance 
because workers‟ protests stay within bound of the existing regulations 
imposed by the state, and they usually appeal the leaders in the Central 
Government to look into their grievances. In other words, Chinese labor 
protests in the post-socialist era can be called “rightful resistance” because 
they are merely defensive struggles, aiming to get back their “rightful” 
share promised by the state and factory management (like pay wages on 
time, pay minimum wages, receive medical compensations for on-the-job 
injury, and get compensations for overtime work, etc.); they are not aimed 
to challenge the authority of the post-socialist party-state or the existing 
capitalist system. 
 
State Response: Legal Absorption of Labor Conflict.  Since the labor 
protests are not directed at the post-socialist party-state, and they are only 
directed at individual enterprise on a case-by-case basis, the Chinese 
party-state has articulated a response what can be called “legal absorption 
of labor conflict” by setting up new labor legislations more congruence 
with the interests of labor. The aim is to divert the surging labor conflict to 
the formal legal channel and to improve the individual rights of the 
working class without improving its collective rights. In other words, the 
aim is to improve the wage and other compensation for individual workers 
without at the same time leading to the rise of working class at a collective 
level to form a class-wise organization or to engage in a collective social 
movement. 
 
The post-socialist party-state has always tried very hard to 
suppress the formation of the working class and an independent labor 
movement. The party-state accomplishes this goal through setting up a 
nation-wide official trade union. Workers are deprived of the rights of 
organization to form independent trade union in China. Instead, they are 
only allowed to join the All China Federation of Trade Union (ACFTU), the 
only trade union officially sanctioned by the party-state. It is always clear 
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that the ACFTU is an organization of the party-state rather than a 
working-class organization. The ACFTU is obliged to obey the Chinese 
Communist Party leadership, as stated in trade union regulations: “Trade 
Union shall observe and safeguard the Constitution … uphold the socialist 
road, the people‟s democratic dictatorship, leadership of the Communist 
Party of China and Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng 
Xiaoping Theory” (Leung 2008). ACFTU is expected to “penetrate private 
enterprises and act as a middleman” to resolve any labor conflicts that 
erupt in the enterprises. 
  
It is under this historical context of post-socialist development 
which aims to safeguard individual rights while suppressing the collective 
rights of Chinese workers that many labor laws (like The Trade Union 
Law in 1992; The Production Safety Law in 2002; The National Labor Law 
in 1995) were formulated over the past two decades. 
 
However, the previous labor laws set up before 2008 have failed to 
stop the abuses of business on the Chinese workers. For example, 
although basic labor contract regulations (on working hours, wages, labor 
safety, social insurance, labor disputes) were already laid out under the 
1995 Labor Law, many local Chinese enterprises and foreign factories still 
do not have employment contracts with their workers. As Wang et al. 
(2009, p.486) explain: “The Chinese labor law was a vague and ambiguous 
set of statutes of which most workers knew little, thus giving employers 
significant latitude to interpret the law and explain regulations in ways 
that served their self-interest.”   
 
In this respect, many researchers have labeled the 2008 Labor 
Contract Law as the most significant piece of Chinese labor legislation 
passed in recent years (Becker and Elfstrom 2010; Chan 2009; Karindi 
2008; Wang et al 2009).  The aim of this paper is to examine the 
distinctive features, the historical process of the making, and the impact of 
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the Labor Contract Law at the turn of the 21st century. In conclusion, this 
paper will discuss the implications of the Labor Contract Law for meeting 
the challenge of labor unrest in China. 
 
 To recall, the Labor Contract Law was first presented to the 
Chinese public for comments in December 2005; it was formally approved 
by China‟s NPC (National People‟s Congress) in June 2007. It took effect 
in January 2008. 
 
What Issues are at Stake in the Labor Contract Law? 
 
 The Labor Contract Law is often labeled as the “Labor Contract 
Law” by some analysts because it stipulates clearly that every Chinese 
worker needs to be protected by a written contract. Millions of the migrant 
workers working at the S&M (Small and Medium) firms in the foreign 
sector don‟t have contracts, leaving them in legal limbo unable to access 
existing rights and benefits however limited. The Labor Contract Law is 
aimed to fill in this loophole. In particular, the Labor Contract Law has 
the following distinctive features: 
 
 A valid written labor contract must be offered by the employer 
before a worker is asked to start working. If an employer has not 
given a worker a contract after 30 days, a contract is automatically 
assumed providing wages and working standards prevalent in the 
industry in which the worker is employed. 
 
 Open-ended contracts for employment are required for those 
workers who have completed two fixed term contracts or with more 
than 10 years of service in a firm. That means a permanent contract 
of legally valid labor relationship is automatically formed from the 
date a worker begins to provide substantial labor service to the 
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employer, and workers are protected from dismissal without a valid 
cause. 
 Severance Payment. Employers are now obliged to give severance 
payment which is about one month for every year one has worked in 
the firm. Previously, employers can offer fixed term contracts that 
automatically end without the need for termination or severance 
pay. 
 
 Contribution to Social Security and set labor standard.  The Labor 
Contract Law also requires employers to contribute to their 
employee‟s social security accounts and set wage standards for 
workers on probation and overtime. 
 
 Consequences for violations.  The new law states that if employers 
fail to sign contracts or pay wages on time, workers not only can ask 
for compensation form the employer, but they also can ask the court 
to get their wages back.  The law also states that government 
officials will face administrative penalties or criminal prosecution 
for abusing their authority that result in serious harm to the 
interests of workers. 
 
 Expands the Scope of Bargaining over Company Policies and Work 
Rules. The new law requires companies to negotiate company rules 
and regulations on a broad array of issues from compensation to 
health and safety issues, to vacation and days off. 
 
 Expands the Role of (official) Unions.  The new law expands the role 
of official unions by allowing a broader scope for collective 
bargaining at the enterprise level. 
 
China Daily reported that when the draft labor law was completed 
in December 2005, the Chinese leaders decided to seek public comments 
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on the draft, an action which China Daily describes as “rare, if not 
unprecedented” (Batson and Fong 2007). This action reflects the party-
state wants to involve interest groups and the public at large in the 
formation of the Labor Contract Law; it is a step toward the long march of 
making the post-socialist party-state more transparent and more 
responsive to social forces in society. 
  
A public comment period of one month provoked a series of heated 
debates in Chinese society.  China Daily reported the party-state has 
received a total of 191,849 responses through internet, media, and mail. 
Most of the comments came from individual workers and Chinese trade 
groups, but there were comments from transnational corporations and 
their Chambers of Commerce. 
 
Historical Process in the Making of the Labor Contract Law 
 
 In 2006 Tasini (2006) reports that US-based global corporations like 
Wal-Mart, Microsoft, Nike, AT&T, acting through the following three US 
business organizations: 
 
 The American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai which 
represents over 1,300 corporations, including 150 Fortune 500 
companies 
 The US-China Business Council, representing 250 US 
companies doing business across all sectors in China 
 The European Union Chamber of Commerce in China , 
representing more than 860 companies 
 
have put up a concerted effort to actively lobby against the Labor Contract 
Law in China. They are also threatening that foreign corporations will 
withdraw from China if the labor law is passed. 
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 What explains the keen interests of the transational corporations on 
a Labor Contract Law in China?  Business lobbies are worried that strict 
contract requirement of the Labor Contract Law could raise costs and give 
the transnationals less flexibility to hire and fire in China. The 
transnationals are also concerned about the major role that China‟s 
officially sanctioned trade union will play in collective bargaining (Batson 
and Fong 2007). 
   
For transnationals, the Labor Contract Law is a battle they have to 
fight because efforts to improve the wages and the conditions of Chinese 
workers have profoundly implications for workers everywhere. In the 
2000s, one in four workers in the global economy is now Chinese. Business 
lobbies worry that improving the wages and labor standards in China will 
drive up wages and labor standard not only in China but also in other part 
of the world. Improving labor conditions in China can help workers in the 
rest of the world to resist a trend so-called “the race to the bottom” in the 
globalization era (McMichael 1996). 
 
Global Labor Strategies (2008) report that the transnationals‟ battle 
over the Labor Contract Law in China is not one-sided winning; instead 
the battle has gone through twists and turns. In the beginning in April 
2006, the transationals started the battle by putting an all-round attack. 
The American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai (AmCham), for instance, 
issued a 42-page submission on behalf of its 1,300 corporate members to 
the Chinese government. AmCham demanded a list of revisions and 
outright reversals of “rigid” regulations, including provisions making it 
harder to fire workers, new protections for temporary workers, and 
restrictions on non-compete agreements. Similar submissions were sent to 
the Chinese government by EU Chamber of Commerce on other lobby 
organizations.  AmCham warned the Labor Contract Law may negatively 
impact the PRC‟s competitiveness and appeal as a destination for foreign 
investment; the AmCham makes threats to withdraw their investments 
Journal of Studies in Social Sciences                                         142 
from China if the current version of the legislation passed, arguing the 
Chinese government was turning the clock back twenty years. 
 
 According to a lawyer at a firm representing AmCham members in 
China, comments from the business community appear to have an impact. 
Whereas the March 2006 draft offered a substantial increase in the 
protection for employees and greater role for unions than existing law, the 
[new draft] scaled back protections for employees and sharply curtailed 
the role of unions (Lauffs, 2007). 
 
 Corporate lobbies largely concentrated their efforts on eliminating 
new contract rights for workers, including mandatory collective bargaining 
requirements over health and safety, wages, and layoffs; limitations on 
probation periods; mandated severance payments; and new protections for 
temporary workers. While some protections for workers remain in the 
second draft of the legislations, Global Labor Strategies‟ (2007) analysis 
shows that many important provisions have been seriously weakened or 
eliminated wholesale in response to global corporate threats and demands. 
For example, the new law has watered down the role of trade union in 
collective bargaining. The revised law now states that employer need only 
listen to the advice (but need not seek the approval) of the union before the 
company makes any layoff over 20 employees or 10 percent of total 
employees. 
 
 Aside from the transnationals, the Chinese capitalist class also 
rallied against the legislation of the Labor Contract Law. A leading voice 
among the Chinese capitalist class was Ms. Zhang Yin who was the 
chairwoman of Hong Kong-listed Nine Dragon Paper Holdings, the largest 
containerboard manufacturer in China. Zhang is reported as the richest 
woman in China in 2006 and became a member of Chinese People‟s 
Political Consultative Committee (CPPCC) in 2008. In attacking the draft 
Labor Contract Law, Zhang said that “if the law over protects the labor, an 
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enterprise can hardly operate” (World by Data 2007). Zhang further 
complaints that “signing labor contracts without a fixed-term proposed in 
the new Labor Contract Law is equal to the iron rice -bowl policy during 
the age of planned economy” (China Review News 2008).  Later at the 
CPPCC meeting in March 2008, Zhang made a motion calling for the 
scrapping of the core provision of the Labor Contract Law, i.e., eliminating 
the provision that long-time workers who had provided a substantial 
service to an employer should receive an open-ended labor contract. 
Zhang‟s CPPCC motion had attracted mass media attention and aroused 
national heated debates on how to enhance labor protection in order to 
avoid “potential hazards” to the local economy.  
 
Labor & Human Rights Group Worldwide Fight for Rights of 
Chinese Workers 
 
 However, the above offensive movement that business conducted 
against the Labor Contract Law was not without resistance from labor and 
human rights groups. After the global media had publicized the role of 
foreign corporations in lobbying against reform of Chinese labor law, a 
series of fissures began to emerge with the corporations in China and the 
business lobbies that represent them. Obviously, we do not know what has 
happened behind the closed doors of the corporate chamber, but Global 
Labor Strategies (2007) has pieced together the information from the mass 
media to infer what may be going on. 
 
 For example, Nike has suddenly distanced itself so far from 
AmCham‟s position that prompted a headline “Nike Repudiates AmCham 
Position on Chinese Law Reform” in ITGLWF‟s new release (ITGLWF 
2006).  
 
An even more remarkable shift occurred in the attitude of the 
E.U.Chamber of Commerce in China. Initially, E.U. Chamber criticized 
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the draft labor law and issued a veiled threat that European corporations 
that it represented would abandon China if the Labor Contract Law were 
passed. On December 8, 2006, the E.U. Chamber suddenly reversed its 
position in a public statement stating that the Chamber believes that 
there is a serious need to improve working conditions in China and the 
Chamber stands firmly behind the Chinese government‟s efforts to 
improve working conditions (E.U. chamber of Commerce 2006). 
 
 A number of corporations too have tried to put distance between 
themselves and the original positions of the foreign business lobbies. 
Ericcson, for example, dissociated itself from the threats of withdrawing 
from China initially made by the EU Chamber of Commerce: 
 
Ericcson supports the Chinese government‟s legislative 
efforts to improve the labor law and regulations for 
working standards . . . Ericsson is in no way actively 
lobbying against the proposed legislation by the Chinese 
government. Nor has Ericsson threatened to pull out of 
China if the new labor laws were to be passed. . . . Just 
because we are a member of the European Chamber of 
Commerce does not necessarily mean we endorse every 
lobbying initiative (Ericcson 2007). 
 
 What explains the reverse position of some transnationals and their 
business lobbies? Global Labor Strategies (2007, p.28) suggests two 
explanations. First, there is the explanation of a divided corporate world. 
The emerging division may reflect differences of interest among different 
foreign sectors. Nike‟s image is a crucial part of what it sells, and it has 
been intent to project itself as a leader in human rights ever since its 
image was damaged by labor rights campaigns. Some companies hope to 
sell products in China, and regard both a positive image and rising wages 
in China to be to their benefit. Some foreign corporations, conversely, view 
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China primarily as a source of cheap labor for exports and oppose 
anything that might raise their labor costs. The breakup of a common 
front among foreign corporations offers the promise of reducing one of the 
main barriers to effective labor legislation for the benefit of Chinese 
workers. 
 
 The other explanation is social struggles. The emerging division in 
the corporate world is the product of the social struggles waged by labor 
and human rights groups worldwide on behalf of Chinese workers. 
 A leading role in this social struggle has been taken by the 
International Textile, Garment, and Leather Workers Federation 
(ITGLWF). The ITGLWF (2006) issued a statement entitled 
“Multinationals Accused of Hypocrisy over China Labour Law Reform,” 
demanding that EU and US corporations halt their lobby campaigns 
against the modest improvements embodied in the new law. Neil Kearney, 
General Secretary of the ITGLWF, approached numerous apparel and 
footwear employers to request that they “distance themselves from the 
position of their industry associations. Many industrial corporations like 
Nike have been reversed their previous position as a result of this 
pressure from unions (Global Labor Strategies 2007, p.33). 
 
 Similarly, the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) has 
played a primary role in forcing the E.U. Chamber of Commerce to 
“clarify” its position after its aggressive lobby campaign against the Labor 
Contract Law was exposed. After the Chamber‟s initial actions, John 
Monks (2006), General Secretary of the ETUC, demanded that “European 
companies should behave outside Europe as they are supposed to do inside. 
They should certainly not act to drive standards down.”  Later, ETUC 
further condemns the “disgraceful occurrences” of threats by the European 
Chambers of Commerce in Beijing to reconsider new investment in 
response to the proposal to improve labor laws. Subsequently, the EU 
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Chamber revised its position, saying that the Chamber now stands firmly 
behind the Chinese government‟s efforts to improve working conditions. 
 
 Observing the changing tide of the Chamber, other trade unions 
and their officials, including the AFL-CIO, European Metal Workers, and 
the Dutch Federation of Trade Union, soon issued press releases, exposed 
U.S. and E.U. Chambers‟ efforts on their blogs, and used a host of other 
campaign techniques to draw public attention to the issue. 
 
 Many human rights groups and other NGOs have also been 
involved in the fight to protect the worker rights included in the new law, 
including the German Toy Campaign, PC-Global, India Committee of the 
Netherlands, Center for the Research on Multinational Corporations, and 
the CSR Platform, a coalition of 40 unions and NGOs working on 
Corporate Social Responsibility issues. The Business and Human Rights 
Resource Centre, chaired by former UN Human Rights Commissioner 
Mary Robins and affiliated with Amnesty International, asked leading 
companies about their role in opposing the law, then posted their 
responses on its website.  As Chris Avery, Director, and Gregory 
Regaingnon, Senior Researcher for the Centre explained: 
 
Respect for labor rights is a core aspect of companies‟ 
human rights obligations. Companies‟ position on labor 
rights issues, including on labor law reform in countries 
such as China, are a major part of their human rights 
impacts, as are the lobbying activities of companies‟ 
associations (Global Labor Strategies 2007, pp.35-36). 
 
In China too, local labor NGOs had waged a resistance movement against 
business‟ offense against the Labor Contract Law. For example, SACOM 
(Student and Scholars against Corporate Misbehavior) immediately 
conducted an investigation on two product sites of Zhang Yin‟s Nine 
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Dragon Paper Holdings after Zhang voiced an attack on the labor 
protection clause in the Labor Contract Law. Later, SACOM used a  public 
report uncovering instances of exploitation in Zhang‟s factories and issued 
a call for public action against Zhang‟s exploitative labor practices 
(SACOM 2008). 
 SACOM‟s report aroused a lot of mass media interests in China. 
Dozens of influential opinion leaders subsequently wrote on newspaper 
and on internet, accusing Zhang Yin‟s of exploitative practices and her 
questioning her integrity in her position of the new Labor Contract Law 
non-sense. Hundreds of reporters also surrounded Zhang Yin‟s production 
sites to look for more headline stories related to her exploitation of 
workers. For nearly three whole weeks in 2007, the Chinese public turned 
their attention to labor rights violations and unfair labor practices in 
China, showing that the new Labor Contract Law had a lot of support in 
the Chinese civil society. 
 Observing the split in transitional business community 
and getting the support of the global labor and human rights 
groups both inside and outside China, the party-state held its 
position firm in promoting the labor law despite receiving a 
strong opposition from the transnational and Chinese business 
lobbies. In January 2008, the Labor Contract Law was finally put 
into effect. The final version has the following three major 
features: 
 The final version said companies only need to “consult” 
the state-backed union if it plans workforce reduction, 
suggesting a softening from earlier drafts that gave union 
the right to “approve or reject” layoffs before they could 
take place. 
 
 The final version, however, retained language that limits 
“probationary contracts” that many employers use to deny 
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employees full-time status. It also states that severance 
pay will be required for many workers and tightens the 
conditions under which an employee can be fired. 
 
 In addition, the Labor Contract Law empowers company-
based branches of the state-run unions or employee 
representative committees to engage in collective 
bargaining with employees over salaries, bonuses, 
training, and other work-related matters. 
 
What then are the impacts of Labor Contract Law to businesses, 
workers, and the party-state? And what is the implication of the 
Labor Contract Law for the absorbing humane conflict in China? 
 
Impacts of the Labor Contract Law: Business 
 
 Taking advantages of the global recession, business group protested 
by closing down or relocation. Canaves (2009) reported that in the first 
months of 2008, 15,661 enterprises in Guangdong, the manufacturing-
heavy southern province, shut their doors. Workers say companies avoid 
paying claims by liquidating or by just disappearing without properly 
settling their business. 
 
There was also a scramble by companies to circumvent the labor 
contract requirement before the law came into effect. The most publicized 
case was Huawei Technologies – China‟s largest telecommunication 
equipment manufacture and a former state-owned firm. Huawei asked 
7,000 employees with more than eight years of service to resign and accept 
re-employment as “new staff.” Huawei‟s model was quickly copied 
throughout Guangdong Province. Wang et al (2009, p.493) reported that 
Dayawan Huili Daily Products Co Ltd forced half its 2,000 employees to 
terminate their old contracts and sign a new one, and more than 2,000 
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employees in Henan Zhengzhou Transport Company experienced the same 
situation. 
  
Divjak (2008) also reported “creative” employers in China had already 
worked out ways to get around the minimal restrictions contained in the 
new legislation. Donald Straszheim, vice chairman of Los Angeles-based 
Roth Capital Partners, said: “We are seeing new labor contracts, two half-
time shifts, the use of outside staffing companies, the creation of new 
companies to do the same work, so-called voluntary resignations before 
year-end only to rehired on Jan 1, 2009. How to make workers voluntary 
resign their jobs? Wang et al. (2009, p.494) reported that some employers 
purposely put their aging workers into physically demanding jobs; others 
transferred their senior managers to entry-level posts; a 33-year-old found 
that his firm had moved to Fengxian and changed its name, legal 
representatives and stockholders, thus all the old contracts had become 
invalid overnight. He signed a new contract with a new company, but his 
work years went back to zero. 
 Furthermore, in order to avoid minimum wage provisions, 
employers are increasing the dormitory and canteen prices in order to 
offset wages. Workers also reported the factories have imposed a stricter 
discipline and an increase in employee‟s fines for any number of 
insubordinations (Wang et al 2009). 
 
Impact of the Labor Contract Law: Labor 
 
Parry Leung (2008) reported that the legislation of the labor law, 
even just before it took effect in 2008, had triggered a new round of labor 
protest beyond the established legal channel. In the industrialized zone in 
Pearl River Delta, a dozen large-scale worker protests and collective action 
were reported in the Hong Kong and Guangzhou media in Nov-Dec, 2006 
(see Table 1). For example, over 700 workers started to strike in a Taiwan 
invested electronic factory on Dec. 14, 2007 and blocked a nearby road for 
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3 hours. Workers asked for minimum wage protection and protest against 
the termination of existing employment contract. 
  
The labor law also provided opportunity to raise workers‟ right 
conscious when they discuss the details the law in 2005-2007. When the 
legislation was open for public discussion and input, over 190,000 
comments were received from the civil society in China. Many NGOs like 
Shenzhen Dagogzhe Migrant Worker Center actively spread the 
knowledge of the Labor Contract Law and arouse worker‟s enthusiasm to 
discuss it.  According to Manfred Elfstrom from the International Labour 
Rights Forum, labor NGOs in mainland China saw a spike in attendance 
at their legal training classes (almost double previous attendance) right 
after the Labor Contract Law went into effect on January 2008 (Wang et 
al. 2009, p.496). 
 
 When the Labor Contract Law took effect in January 2008, the Wall 
Street Journal reported (Canaves 2009) there was a big jump of labor 
disputes, showing the rising rights conscious of the workers. Just in the 
city of Guangzhou, the local arbitration office received more than 60,000 
cases from January through November, about as many cases it handled 
over the previous two years combined. Huang Huping, deputy director of 
the labor bureau in Donguan, said, “Before we would try to mediate more 
disputes before going to arbitration, but now that workers have the right 
to go to arbitration, they choose to do that right away.” The Chinese media 
in 2009 have also reported numerous recent incidents of labor unrest, from 
taxi strikes to protests by factory workers over unpaid wages. 
 
 The labor law also makes the official trade union more active. The 
ACFTU, the official labor union, is starting 866 legal aid centers in 
preparing for a national-wide campaign for enforcement of the Labor 
Contract Law (Global Labor Strategies 2007, p.38). Hon DongFang (2005), 
a well-known labor activist, also pointed out that during the drafting of 
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the labor law; official unions have to respond to the workers‟ demand once 
their rights conscious is aroused. 
 
 All the above factors eventually led to a stronger resistance from the 
Chinese workers. About a year after the passing of the Labor Contract 
Law, 13 young migrant workers attempted or committed suicide at two 
FOXCONN production facilities in South China, an act interpreted as a 
protest against an inhumane labor regime that is widely practiced in 
China (Chan and Pun 2010).   
Workers‟ suicides were followed by the strike waves in the summer 
of 2010. The strikes first started at Honda production lines in South China: 
1,900 workers engaged in strike for as long as 19 days from May 17 to 
June 4.  What is significant about the Honda strike is that workers not 
only raised the demand of forming an independent trade union during the 
strike, but the strikers were also reported to have a physical confrontation 
with official union members on May 31st, 2010.  At around 2 pm on May 
31st, a Honda worker who had been interviewed by Chris Chan the day 
before sent him a mobile phone message saying that “members from the 
district trade union started beating strikers in a chaotic situation!”   
Honda workers later told Chris Chan that the strikers were beaten up by 
about 200 people mobilized by the town- and district-level trade union. A 
few of strikers were hurt and sent to a nearby hospital (Chan and Hui 
Unpublished). 
 
Another significance of the Honda strike was that it triggered by a 
series of strike across factories, across industries, and even across regions 
from Shenzhen and Foshan to Kunshan and Huizhou (Lau and Choi 2010).  
The strike wave in 2010 is different from the previous strikes in post -
socialist China, as the previous strikes (labeled as cellular activism by Lee 
2007) tended be to confined to a particular enterprise or workplace and 
could not spread from one workplace to another, from one industry to 
another, or from one locality to another.  
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Impact of the Labor Contract Law: The Chinese party-state 
 
 When the strike wave first erupted in Honda in May 2010, the post-
socialist party-state allowed the Chinese mass media to cover the strikes 
in details. The tacit approval of coverage of the strikes seems to reflect a 
genuine desire of the party-state to see higher wages for the workers so as 
to increase domestic consumption during the global economic crisis.  
 
The above speculation is confirmed by the fact that soon after the 
strike wave in early summer 2010, various local governments in Shenzhen, 
Nanhai, and Beijing quickly announced that they would raise the 
minimum wage by 10-20 percentages in the following months (Insurgent 
Notes, 2010).  In August 2010, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao further 
bluntly warned “Japan that its companies operating in China should raise 
pay for the workers” during a high-level Japan-China meeting. Wen told 
the Japanese officials that the background of labor troubles was the 
relatively low level of pay at some foreign companies (Browne and 
Shirouzu 2010). 
 
 It seems that the strike waves had convinced the party-state that 
the Labor Contract Law cannot resolve the deep-rooted labor conflict in 
the economy.  Something needs to be done to prevent the 2010 strikes from 
escalating into a large-scale class war against the status quo. In this 
respect, the Labor Contract Law is well positioned because it effectively 
builds on the labor rights that provide the necessary legal basis for a 
genuine collective bargaining system. In particular, the earlier draft of the 
Labor Contract Law stipulated that it is the employer‟s responsibility to 
sign a collective labor contract with the employees‟ representative within 
an enterprise.  
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However, the Labor Contract Law later became ineffective because 
its final version had eliminated the initial clause that would allowed 
workers to independent negotiate with management.  Thus, it may be 
necessary to bring back the initial clause to close the loophole of the Labor 
Contract Law so as to strengthen collective bargaining in order to 
minimize the workers‟ tendency to engage in wildcat strikes. After all, as 
By William (2010) points out, “Although the Chinese authorities have long 
frowned on labor unrest, they have looked the other way at a recent spate 
of strikes and demand for higher wages. In fact, in some cases, local 
authorities have one the collective bargaining for their citizens by 
mandating higher minimum wages.” 
 
Consequently, the official All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
(ACFTU) is working to implement a collective bargaining system 
nationwide among the trade union-established enterprises in China by 
2012. A special committee consisting of about 60,000 members was put 
together by ACFTU to negotiate the wage issues between enterprises and 
employees across China. ACFTU also planned to invest 100 million Yuan 
in the first batch of trail cities for collective bargaining. In 2010, 23 cities 
and provinces have enacted rules and regulations on collective bargaining; 
and 13 cities and provinces in China are developing collective bargaining.  
The goal is to have collective contracts to be signed in more than 80 
percent of the enterprises in China by the end of 2013 (Chen 2010). 
 
In mid-2010, it is reported that Guangdong province is currently 
drafting regulations that would establish a legally binding collective wage 
bargaining system if 20 percent or more of workers sought it.  In addition, 
the Collective Negotiation Act is currently under public hearing in 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone. 
 
Implications for Legal Absorption Labor Unrest in China 
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 This paper studies the origins, the process of drafting, and the 
impact of the Labor Contract Law at the latter half of the first decade of 
the 21st century. The new Labor Contract Law is important because it may 
indicate the turning point of China‟s labor regime. 
 
 Before the turn of the 21st century, China‟s world-workshop model 
of development was built upon its linkages to the tail end of the global 
production, i.e., it served as the subcontractors of the transnational 
corporations and engaged in low value-added, labor intensive industries 
whose profitability is dependent upon the “super-exploitation” of docile 
migrant workers in a sweat-shop factory. In order to attract the 
investment of foreign corporations and the promotion of export-led 
industrialization, Chinese party-state had put a blind eye towards all sorts 
of abuses of labor rights inside the enterprises. However, increasing labor 
unrest over the past decade raised the challenge that this sweat-shop 
mode of production is no longer sustainable as the first generation of 
migrant labor matured and getting organized. Therefore, in early 2000s, 
the post-socialist party-state has decided to gradually phase out the low 
value-added, labor intensive, polluting industries and moved China‟s 
economy up the value chain. Since China‟s development is no longer 
dependent on the sweat shop model, the Labor Contract Law is aimed to 
move toward a more humane industrial relationship like that in Western 
Europe. 
 
 In addition, the global financial crisis in 2008 and the economic 
decline of the Western advanced states has led to a new push towards a 
restructuring of the China‟s model from an export-led industrialization to 
a more balanced development based on both exports and domestic market 
(So 2011). In order to enlarge the domestic market, it is necessary to 
increase the wages and the living standard of the Chinese workers so they 
can buy more Chinese products. This re-orientation of the Chinese 
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economy serves to lay the foundation for to phase out the previous sweat 
shop model in the factory.  
 
 In conclusion, we want to point out that the Labor Contract Law 
has significant implication for meeting the challenge of labor unrest in 
China. First, using the “rule of law” and developing a European labor code, 
instead of intensifying the repressive apparatus (like police and prison) to 
deal with the labor unrest, is a very good sign that the post-socialist party-
state is committed to transform itself into a modern state to 
commensurate with the rise of China in the inter-state system. 
 
 Second, the way that the state promotes the Labor Contract Law is 
also very promising. Instead of imposing the Labor Contract Law from 
above just like the repressive party-state has done many times before, the 
labor legislation was first open for public discussion and for public input 
before the party-state finalized the final draft. This fact shows the party-
state is more transparent and more open to the inputs of civil society  than 
before. 
 
 Third, Chinese workers responded to the Labor Contract Law not 
only by giving their opinions (190,000 comments) to the party-state, but 
they also rise up in protests and in engaging in labor disputes to defend 
their rights. NGOs and trade unions are also more active than before in 
spreading the rights consciousness to the working class. Together with 
other indicators, such as the “right resistance” movement of the peasantry 
in the countryside and the “rights resistance” protests of the new middle 
class in the urban areas, the rising number of labor disputes during and 
after the labor law may indicate right conscious is rising in post-socialist 
China. 
 
 Finally, the Labor Contract Law in 2008 has led to a new collective 
bargaining law in the near future. It seems that the strike wave in 2010 
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has convinced the party-state that it cannot delay tackling the issue of 
collective bargaining anymore. Observing the so-called Jasmine 
Revolution in the Middle East and the violent riots in European cities in 
2011, the party-state must feel the urgency to cut down the intensity of 
labor conflict in the workplace. 
 
 In short, the battle of Labor Contract Law at the turn of the 21st 
century is a very promising step in a long march for the meeting the 
challenge of labor unrest in China when the Chinese citizens are becoming 
more conscious in asserting their rights in the workplace, and when 
strikes show the sign of spreading across-region and across-industry, and 
when the Chinese post-socialist party-state is worrying about the threat of 
Jasmine Revolution in civil society. 
 
Table 1. Reported Labor Conflicts in 2007 Triggered by the forthcoming 
Labor Contract Law Legislation in Jan 2008 
 
Date Location Company Details 
Dec 22 Shenzhen A massage 
company 
Over 200 blind massagers took strike for 4 
days against employers‟ termination of 
existing employment contract. 
Dec 20 Shenzhen An IT 
company 
Over 1000 workers took strike and blocked 
the Shennan Avenue against employers‟ 
termination of existing employment 
contract and reduction of benefits. 




Over 700 workers took strike and blocked a 
nearby road for 3 hours. Workers asked for 
minimum wage protection and protest 
against termination of existing employment 
contract. 




Over 600 workers took strike and blocked a 
nearby road against employers‟ termination 
of existing employment contract. 
 Dec 10 Shenzhen A HK Over 2000 workers took strike for 3 days 
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invested  
factory 
against employers‟ termination of existing 
employment contact and reduction of 
benefits in the new contract. 




Over 1000 workers took strike against 
employer arbitrary dismissal of 3 senior 
workers. 




Over 8000 workers took strike and blocked 
a nearby road for 6 hours.  Workers asked 
for higher wages and protest against the 
increase of food charge. 
Nov 23 Dongguan An 
electronic 
factory 
Over 800 workers took strike against 
dismissal due to factory relocation. 
Nov 20 Shenzhen Nil A labor activist working of a labor NGO was 
assaulted for promoting Labor Contract 
Law. 
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